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Abstract 
Political rumors, half-truths and unfortunate candid com-
ments from candidates spread like wildfire across the social 
media spectrum, meaning social channels require constant 
care and maintenance. The purpose of this study is to exam-
ine how Facebook addiction can affect levels of gullibility to 
online political rumors. Prior to the 2012 elections, more 
than 500 respondents participated in a survey designed to 
measure gullibility to online political rumors. Respondents 
reported levels of addiction to Facebook and were asked to 
determine the validity of 20 statements regarding President 
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Barack Obama and Republican candidate Mitt Romney. 
The statements varied in their level of accuracy, some ob-
viously rumor, others seemingly true, but all originated 
from Internet sources and were disseminated by various 
Facebook users. In separate survey sections, political 
knowledge and the political activity of the users Facebook 
“friends” were measured. Results indicated that both Face-
book addiction and gullibility decreased with age and the 
two variables have a strong correlation between them.   
 
D 
uring the 2012 presidential election, political 
campaigns dominated broadcasts, airwaves, 
print pages, websites, and social media—
specifically, Facebook pages and news feeds. 
Although traditional media forms are still an integral part 
of political campaigns, social networking sites are being 
mined by candidates for their value in sending unfiltered 
messages to the public, particularly niche audiences and 
young voters (Price, 2012). In recent election cycles, suc-
cessful candidates have been forced to conquer social me-
dia. When managed and monitored properly, social media 
channels can make a candidate appealing to young voters. 
But, when untamed and unwatched, social media can dev-
astate a campaign. Political rumors, half-truths, and the 
occasional unfortunate candid commentary from candi-
dates can spread like wildfire across the social media spec-
trum. Instead of discussing politics around the dinner ta-
ble, Americans are taking to social media channels to air 
their political opinions in greater numbers than before. 
Thus, for modern political candidates, social channels re-
quire constant care and maintenance. 
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Social Media and Politics 
  The 21st century has been marked by rapid 
changes in technology and communication mediums. As 
technology has advanced, campaign platforms have fol-
lowed. In 1996, the first major political figure to utilize so-
cial media was Howard Dean, who announced his cam-
paign for the presidency in an Internet chat room. Subse-
quent campaigns took this emerging trend a step further, 
by building candidate websites, blogs, and email lists 
(Semiatin, 2012). Perhaps the most revolutionary change 
came with the advent of social networking sites such as 
Friendster in 2002, followed by MySpace in 2003, and 
Facebook in 2004 (Semiatin, 2012). Even during the emer-
gence of these platforms, Facebook proved to be a valuable 
resource for political campaigns.  
According to Kerbel and Bloom (2005), the Internet 
can serve as a "vehicle for enhanced civic involvement" (p. 
3). In fact, online discussions and personal relationships in 
cyberspace may provide participants a sense of commu-
nity. Facebook, a fertile environment for these public dis-
cussions, first came into the political arena in 2006, when 
the social network created profiles for all U.S. congres-
sional and gubernatorial candidates (Williams & Gulati, 
2007). These Facebook profiles allowed candidates to post 
photographs and biographical information, interact with 
supporters via “wall” posts and publicize their support of 
other candidates or political issues once the candidate took 
control of his/her page. Previous research examining the 
role of these Facebook profiles in the 2006 midterm elec-
tions suggested that the candidate who had more Face-
book supporters would earn a related increased vote share, 
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an effect especially pronounced in open-seat races 
(Williams & Gulati, 2007).  
During the 2006 election, one-third of candidates 
running for Senate and about one of every ten candidates 
running for House seats took advantage of this stream-
lined opportunity by updating their Election Pulse Face-
book profiles.  General Facebook users were able to show 
their support of a candidate by “liking” or interacting with 
the candidate’s page. Research looking at the 2010 and 
2012 elections supported this trend. Social media were 
found to have a positive quantitative link between the 
amount and type of social media usage and real-world po-
litical behavior. In other words, the more a candidate was 
mentioned on social media, the more likely the candidate 
was to get elected (DiGrazia, McKelvey, Bollen, & Rojas, 
2013). However, how the candidate is mentioned and the 
interpretation of that message is unknown; therefore, the 
importance and influence of social networks continues to 
increase. Termed “Web 2.0,” social networks became an 
increased forum for political debate and discussion in the 
2008 elections (Smith & Rainie, 2008). With Facebook in 
particular, candidates—or rather their social media spe-
cialists—communicated campaign messages in a relatively 
non-invasive, personal, relatable, and targeted way 
(Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 2009). This effect 
only proved more pronounced in the 2008 presidential 
election, where the social media prowess of Barack 
Obama’s campaign was lauded as a key factor in his even-
tual election as President of the United States. He used 
social media platforms and mybarackobama.com to con-
nect and make him more accessible in the eyes of voters.  
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One reason for this success was that social net-
working was only beginning to be embraced as a valuable 
forum for political news and discussion. Young voters—
many of whom expressed skepticism to mass media news 
sources and political parties—turned to social networks to 
become “conduits” of news, instead of mere consumers. As 
such, social networking sites were used as a predictor of 
election for the first time and seen as valuable sources of 
political information; 40% of all social networking users 
indicated used Facebook and MySpace to seek political in-
formation (Zhang et al., 2009). For the first time, more 
than half of young voters used social networking sites to 
determine the political interests of their friends and to 
seek campaign information. Because of the active social 
media strategy of the Obama campaign, the president gar-
nered 2.4 million Facebook “supporters” versus McCain’s 
624,000. Facebook was credited with bringing in new vot-
ers, particularly those under the age of 30, which contrib-
uted to Obama’s margin of victory (Zhang et al., 2009). 
This trend continued into his presidency and even more so 
into his bid for reelection in 2012, in which his campaign 
conducted more online activity than any campaign before 
(Price, 2012). 
Social media in the 2012 election. With an enor-
mous influx of users and the hiring of social media 
“strategists” by campaigns, social networking sites were a 
fertile breeding ground for political campaigning and dis-
cussion for the 2012 election. During this most recent elec-
tion cycle, the impact of social media rested first on its ac-
cessibility as a forum for political discourse and an outlet 
for opinions, and second as a communication channel 
through which campaigns could disseminate information. 
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In 2012, 36% of social network users reported that these 
sites were important or very important as a means of 
keeping up with political news (Rainie & Smith, 2012). 
About a quarter of these respondents have used their so-
cial networking profiles to recruit others to get involved in 
issues that matter to them (Rainie & Smith, 2012).  
Data from the Pew Internet & American Life pro-
ject indicated several factors in determining the profile 
and habits of the politically active social media user 
(Rainie et al., 2012). Younger social media users, ages 18-
29, have been shown to use the networks for civic purposes 
more than their older counterparts—44% reported they 
had used social media to “like or promote political mate-
rial,” compared to 24% of users over the age of 65 (Rainie 
et al., 2012). Additionally, research has shown that conver-
sation is essential to political engagement, so it is no sur-
prise that social media—places where political conversa-
tion can thrive—are even more important in influencing 
voters and effecting civic participation today than five 
years ago (Shirky, 2012). In an era of “personalized poli-
tics,” where a high premium is placed on the freedom of 
individual expression, social media present the ideal arena 
for individuals to express opinions and beliefs, apart from 
the influence or gatekeeping quality of mass media 
(Bennett, 2012). By removing government and political 
party spin, social media allow citizens an open forum to 
“challenge discourses, share alternative perspectives and 
publish their own opinions” (Loader & Mercea, 2011, p. 
759). This was put in action in 2012, when 34% of all social 
media users used their sites to post their own thoughts 
and comments on political issues. The number was consid-
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erably higher among younger users, at 42% (Rainie et al., 
2012).  
 
Facebook Habits & Usage 
 To better understand the effects of Facebook on the 
American public, it is important to understand how people 
use this billion-plus member site. In general, Facebook is 
valued by politicians and marketing experts for the insight 
it provides into the thoughts and preferences of others, 
shown through their status updates, pictures, postings, 
and profile settings (Carpenter, Green, & LaFlam, 2011). 
Four major categories of Facebook uses currently exist. As 
an “Interactive Tool,” individuals use their Facebook page 
to manage their social lives and directly communicate with 
friends they have met in-person, both old and new, over 
long and short distances. Likewise, individuals may use 
Facebook as a “Real-Life Supplement” by which they 
schedule or find out about social events or interactions 
with their real-life social groups (Carpenter et al., 2011). 
Individuals also use Facebook to develop “Facebook-only 
Relationships,” which, as the name implies, are relation-
ships that stay online and do not extend to a face-to-face 
connection. Similarly, some individuals use Facebook as a 
“Romantic Tool” to meet and interact with potential ro-
mantic partners on the site before meeting in-person, if at 
all. Individuals who use Facebook for these two purposes 
tend to display defensiveness to other people’s perspec-
tives, favoring Facebook as a means to isolate and distract 
from the deeper social interactions that would occur other-
wise (Carpenter et al., 2011). Users of all four categories 
appreciated Facebook as a means to form a full impression 
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of other people’s perspectives, whether these people were 
in-person friends, or merely online acquaintances.  
Usage of Facebook also varies according to the age 
of the user. Younger users, ages 18-29, consistently use 
their profiles as a focused means of interacting online with 
friends and as a facilitators for real-life interaction 
(Brandtzaeg, Luders & Skjetne, 2010). Users in this age 
group are also increasingly aware of privacy concerns asso-
ciated with the site and of the approval of their peer-
groups. This increases self-awareness and encourages 
young Facebook users to conform their profiles and posts 
to the standard they see as acceptable to their peer groups 
(Brandtzaeg et al., 2010). In comparison, older users tend 
with use Facebook in a less organized fashion, primarily 
as a means to sporadically engage in conversation with 
family and friends. Older users also showed less aware-
ness and concern over the privacy of their profiles—
possibly due to a lack of knowledge about it (Brandtzaeg et 
al., 2010). 
The factors motivating Facebook usage have inter-
ested researchers as the network’s pervasiveness has in-
creased. Studies have shown people use Facebook to main-
tain social ties with various communities, to lower partici-
pation barriers where they may have previously been too 
shy to initiate communication, to experience new commu-
nication opportunities, to supplement real life and to ac-
tively seek out interaction with others (Ellison, Steinfield, 
& Lampe, 2007; Ross et al., 2009). Increased Facebook us-
age has been shown to increase self-awareness and en-
courage conformity, particularly among younger users 
(Brandtzaeg et al., 2010). In addition, Facebook provides 
an easily accessible forum for political debate. It fosters 
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civic engagement, mobilizes voters, increases political par-
ticipation, and influences voter behavior (Bond et al., 
2012; McClurg, 2006; Shirky, 2011; Zhang et al., 2010). 
But, these effects vary dramatically from user to user. 
Even more problematic, the political information posted on 
Facebook is not always accurate and is largely un-
moderated.  
 
Political Engagement on Facebook 
Mass media cannot change political opinions on its 
own. Friends, family, and other social groups must echo 
the opinions and facts transmitted by mass media before 
the information can change a person’s mind and influence 
behavior (Shirky, 2012). This is where social networking 
sites exert their greatest influence; they encourage the for-
mation of political opinions by allowing people to dissemi-
nate the mass media information they agree with to their 
“followers” or “friends” (Shirky, 2012). In fact, 16% of so-
cial network users admit that they have changed their 
views on a certain political topic after reading posts or dis-
cussing it on their social sites (Rainie & Smith, 2012). Al-
though this number is relatively small, it is important to 
consider the demographic makeup of social networking 
sites—they are particularly popular with younger voters 
and can reach millions of people. Additionally, the social 
media users with the loudest political “voices” tend to be 
social movement activists, politicians, party workers, and 
those committed to particular political causes (Loader & 
Mercea, 2011). This makeup carries the potential for 
overly-partisan messages that are heavy on rhetoric and 
opinion, but light on unbiased presentation of facts and 
complete truth. 
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Online Rumor & Gullibility. As social networks be-
come more of a forum for political discussion and cam-
paigning, potential for dishonesty, half-truth and exag-
geration exists. Messages disseminated across social me-
dia are not fact-checked. In fact, 60% of Americans agree, 
“the Internet is full of misinformation and propaganda 
that too many voters believe is accurate” (Smith & Rainie, 
2008). More than half of Americans do not trust informa-
tion delivered through social media, according to a 2012 
Heartland Monitor Poll (Price, 2012). But that does not 
stop 36% of social networking users from turning to social 
networking sites an “important” source for political news 
(Smith & Rainie, 2012). It also does not stop users of social 
media from sharing untrue or unverified political mes-
sages with other users. 
Critics of social networking sites raise concern over 
their capacity to “undermine serious rational delibera-
tion,” instead conditioning users to look for information in 
small, easy-to-understand tidbits of information (Loader & 
Mercea, 2011). Indeed, social networks are hotbeds for 
negative campaigning, sensational news, “celebrity poli-
tics,” extreme rhetoric, and rumor. As mass media and so-
cial networks converge, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
determine truth. In efforts to be the first to break news, 
mass media turn more and more to political blogs and citi-
zen-created content to fill programming, sometimes at the 
cost of fact-checking (Loader & Mercea, 2011). One study, 
on the spread of online rumor, indicated the “news feed” 
feature on Facebook, promotes gossip among friends and 
fuels the unsubstantiated rumors (Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, 
& Hughes, 2009). In a study on the consequences of online 
political rumoring, Garrett (2011) found that concern of 
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harmful political rumoring is merited. Not only were indi-
viduals exposed to more political rumors through the use 
of Internet and online sources of political information, but 
they were also more greatly influenced by these online ru-
mors than those that appeared in traditional offline media 
sources. Data revealed that rumors, emailed to friends and 
family, are more likely to be believed and shared with oth-
ers. Increased rumor circulation, which can occur rapidly 
through social networks, also translated to increased ru-
mor belief, at a highly significant rate. In short, the most 
rumors an individual was exposed to, the more rumors 
that individual was likely to believe. Of concern, shared 
political emails often exhibit strong political biases. 
Garrett (2011) concluded that Internet use promotes expo-
sure to both rumors and their rebuttals and that the net-
work both accelerates and widens rumor circulation. 
Social networks allow citizens and voters to rely on 
political recommendations from friends, networked discus-
sions, tweets (messages on Twitter), posts, and/or direct 
interaction with political organizations. Despite the fact 
that this discourse may contribute to civic participation, it 
requires reliance on the accuracy of information dissemi-
nated by others and not fact-checked by any other source. 
Although previous research has not addressed the truth-
fulness of political postings on social networks, numerous 
studies have confirmed that public political knowledge is 
at a near all-time low (Herther, 2011). When an unin-
formed member of the public is consistently posting politi-
cal opinions, it seems logical that not all of these posts will 
be truthful or accurate in any sense (Herther, 2011). It is 
also important to note that Facebook executives estimate 
about 87 million profiles are duplicate or false accounts—
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many of which are imitations of celebrities or public fig-
ures (Orutay, 2012). Without any means to determine 
what account is a political figure’s “real” account, Face-
book users may be susceptible to believing they are getting 
accurate information from a false account. 
Any person with Internet access possesses the ca-
pability to “post” their opinions, whether true or not, on a 
social networking site. In a society where the most sensa-
tional stories gain traction the fastest, a rumor or falsity 
posted on a social media channel has potential to spread 
quickly and be believed along the way before it is identi-
fied as incorrect. For example, during the 2012 campaign, 
email and social media went ablaze with a rumor that Re-
publican candidate Mitt Romney said he “related to black 
people” because his ancestors were slave owners, in an 
Alabama campaign speech (Mikkleson & Mikkelson, 
2012). It was later uncovered that the rumor originated 
from a post on Free Wood Post, a satirical news website. 
By the time the truth appeared, however, the news had 
already spread and the chances of those it touched seeking 
out proof of its validity were slim (Mikkleson & Mikkelson, 
2012). Rumors on President Obama’s citizenship, religious 
views, birth certificate, and plans if elected were just as 
vibrant in 2012 as they were during his 2008 campaign 
(Jackson, Kiely, & Gore, 2012). 
Through repeated exposure and messages dissemi-
nated by a trusted friend group, social media messages 
have power to shape opinions and voting preferences even 
if they are not true. Political rumors have the power to de-
stroy careers before they are proven true or false. In 2008, 
Australian newspaper The Age ran an article containing 
accusations and supposed evidence that the country’s la-
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bor minister, Theo Thanophanous, had raped a woman 
years before. The story contained quotes from the sup-
posed victim, who was not named in the story (Bolt, 2010). 
The story quickly spread and the public and legislature 
demanded an investigation. The mere accusation of rape 
proved fatal to Thanophanous’ career, and he announced 
his resignation prior to the ensuing police investigation. 
Although his formal charges and the investigation were 
dismissed two months later, Thanophanous remained en-
tirely out of the political arena, stating “I do not wish to 
make this the center of my life but I think that unless we 
learn something from it, it is bound to be repeated to the 
detriment of other individuals and families” (Holmes, 
2010). The smear from an accusation stemming from one 
dishonest individual with poor intentions was enough to 
permanently blot out his role in Australian politics (Bolt, 
2010).  
 
Cultivation  
According to Bandura (2002), it is important to con-
sider the role media play in society as symbolic communi-
cation influences thought and affects action. Not only are 
people reactive, but they also are “self-organizing,” 
“proactive,” and “self-reflective” (p. 121). Thus, it is impor-
tant to consider how individuals act within social systems, 
such as online networking systems. One theory to explain 
the pervasiveness online political rumor is cultivation the-
ory, developed by George Gerbner in the mid-1960s. Culti-
vation theory holds that heavy media users are more likely 
to see the “real world” in terms of the images, values, por-
trayals, and ideologies that emerge through the lens of me-
dia (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2009). Through this 
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process, mass media shapes the audience member’s con-
ceptions of social reality, making reality a mixture of all 
the stories and images the viewer has absorbed. The effect 
on a person’s perception of reality is a consequence of the 
aggregate of messages presented by media outlets, not any 
one story or image in particular. Cultivation theory fo-
cuses on the consequences of long-term exposure to the 
consistent images, portrayals, and values embedded in the 
whole system of messages (Morgan et al., 2009). Although 
little research has been conducted to determine the culti-
vating effects of social media, it has a growing significance 
as a media outlet. It could reinforce the messages dissemi-
nated by traditional news outlets, enhancing the conse-
quences of the long-term exposure to its messages. 
To state it simply, cultivation theory is the belief 
that “media cultivates our social reality; what we watch 
influences how we see the world” (Roskos-Ewoldesen, Da-
vies, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2004). This cultivating process is 
circular and mutually reinforcing: the media influence how 
the public perceives culture and culture influences what 
the media cover. The level of media usage is a chief indica-
tor of how drastically the media will affect a person’s per-
ception of reality. Heavy media users have been shown to 
more readily adopt the worldviews presented consistently 
to them (Morgan et al., 2009). Consequently, heavy and 
light users in the same demographic groups many display 
significantly different conceptions of reality.   
Social Media & Cultivation. Although cultivation 
theory originated with television, it is applicable to social 
media. The predominant themes and rumors that circulate 
on the Internet could have the same cultivating effect on 
political beliefs and attitudes, especially among heavy us-
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ers (Morgan et al., 2009). Shrum (1997) argued that people 
don’t consider the source of information when making real-
ity judgments; instead, they use images heuristically to 
readily make mental judgments. Although few studies 
have been conducted to determine the cultivating effects of 
social media, the concise nature of the messages on social 
networks may prove effective in heuristic decision-making. 
It is reasonable to speculate that heavy social media users 
will eventually begin to adopt some of the political beliefs 
and leanings of the members of their social networks. 
North (2011) applied cultivation theory to social media 
and found that social media can cultivate brand effects, 
trust, and loyalty. Of note, North also found that age and 
time spent on social media channels had an positive effect 
on brand loyalty and trust. However, the relationship be-
tween brand trust and increased time spent on social me-
dia was found to be negative; a discrepancy that indicates 
mediated messages may have a saturation point on social 
media. Additionally, Xenos and Moy (2007) found Internet 
usage, age and education level to have direct effects on re-
call of basic political information as well as political en-
gagement.  
According to Slater (2007), the attitudinal or behav-
ioral outcomes of media can be expected to influence selec-
tion of and attention to media content. This process can 
cultivate the maintenance of social identity, including po-
litical groups. Television may be the primary storyteller in 
American politics, but with the rapid expansion and pres-
ence of social media, its reign as such may be nearing an 
end. However, even if this is the case, the Internet may 
only serve as a means to expand the dominance of media 
corporations by encouraging individuals to visit their own 
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websites, further reinforcing the cultivation of worldviews 
that is taking place through the television screen (Morgan 
et al., 2009). Seeing the same information posted in differ-
ent arenas by one’s friends or family could serve to en-
hance and deepen the cultivating effects. During a normal 
timeframe, a user will see a variety of posts, images and 
messages on a variety of topics. However, during the po-
litical season, the many users not only post their own po-
litical opinions, but also share the posts of others. Many 
social media postings are simply information that was first 
gathered from a traditional media source, or from an 
Internet news outlet (Rainie & Smith, 2012). As people 
increase their time on and usage of Facebook, users can 
become inundated with these messages. This type of 
framework cultivates specific attitudes, dependent upon 
their own information seeking and their processing of the 
heuristic cues presented in their timelines (Morgan et al., 
2009). 
Facebook and Addiction. As individuals around the 
globe have adopted social media sites as a primary conduit 
for communication, the nature of Facebook has been lik-
ened to addiction. From a psychological perspective, heavy 
Facebook use not only cultivates perspectives, but it also 
can rewire brains. Research has indicated that heavy us-
ers of social media experience greater amounts of envy and 
dissatisfaction than lighter users (Buxmann & Krasnova, 
2013), as well as have frontal cortexes that appear funda-
mentally different from light users of the site (Franceschi-
Bicchierai, 2012; Walton, 2012). Additionally, studies have 
found that Internet addicts have a 10-20% smaller brain 
area responsible for speech, memory, motor control, emo-
tion, sensory, and other information. The more times spent 
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online, the greater the atrophy in this area became (Yuan 
et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2011). In fact, the addiction to the 
Internet is a recognized psychological disorder, and it has 
been estimated that as much as 30% of teens could be con-
sidered Internet-addicted (Walton, 2012). Since 2000, at-
tention spans of American teens have decreased 40%, 
ADHD has increased 60%, screen time has increase 104%, 
and multitasking has increased 221% (Franceschi-
Bicchierai, 2012; Woodard & Gridina, 2000).  
Because of these alarming statistics, scholars have 
taken great interest in the level of interaction with and 
addiction to Facebook. In recent years, Andreasson, Tor-
shiem, Brunborg, and Pallesen (2012) proposed a reliable 
Facebook addiction scale, an 18-question survey aimed at 
evaluating an individual’s “addiction” to Facebook based 
on six factors: salience, mood modification, tolerance, with-
drawal, conflict, and relapse.  
 
Research Question 
Previous research has shown that social network-
ing sites, Facebook in particular, have the ability to foster 
civic engagement, mobilize voters, increase political par-
ticipation and influence voter behavior (Bond et al., 2012; 
McClurg, 2006; Shirky, 2011; Zhang et al., 2010). How-
ever, these effects vary dramatically from user to user. In 
an age where political knowledge and information-seeking 
are low, it is vital for the information that the public sees 
regarding politics be truthful and informative. In order to 
understand the effectiveness of Facebook as a means of 
political communication, it must be determined what fac-
tors influence the processing of heuristic cues to cultivate 
an individual’s political framework. Factors such as how a 
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person uses Facebook, the level of “addiction” a person ex-
hibits (Andreasson et al., 2012), and their gullibility to in-
formation spread through social media (i.e. level of infor-
mation seeking) correlate to cultivate the spread of politi-
cal rumors prevalent on the social network (Debatin et al., 
2009). Thus, the following research question and hypothe-
ses were made:  
RQ1: How do people use Facebook for political pur-
poses? 
RQ2: Do people with higher Facebook addiction 
make political posts more frequently than others? 
RQ3: Do people with higher gullibility to online po-
litical rumor make political posts more frequently 
than others? 
As Xenos and Moy (2007) found, age and Internet usage 
have direct effects on recall of basic political information 
as well as political engagement. In order to examine how 
social media influences a person’s processing of heuristic 
cues to cultivate specific frameworks, the following hy-
potheses were posited:  
H1: As a person ages, they will be less addicted to 
Facebook. 
H2: As a person ages, they will be less gullible to 
political rumor.  
H3: Individuals who have high social media con-
sumption will be more gullible to online political 
rumor. 
Finally, the following were posited to examine the interac-
tion of the main variables: 
H4: Individuals with higher Facebook addition will 
be more gullible to online political rumor. 
RQ4: Does age mediate the interaction effect of 
Facebook addiction on gullibility to online political 
rumor? 
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Methodology 
To measure the influence of the Facebook usage 
and addiction on voters’ gullibility to believing online ru-
mors, the researchers created a web-based survey. After 
obtaining appropriate Institutional Review Board approv-
als from the researchers’ university, the online survey was 
sent to 10% of usable faculty, staff, and student addresses 
at the researchers’ university. Data gathering occurred 
exactly one month prior to the national election and con-
tinued through Election Day. Additionally, researchers 
posted the survey link on social media including Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, and Craigslist in order to have a more 
representative sample. Researchers encouraged partici-
pants to share the survey link with others in their social 
networks. 
Upon receiving the email, recipients were directed 
to a website where they completed the questionnaire. Par-
ticipants responded anonymously to closed and open-
ended questions about a number of issues related to their 
traditional and general social media use, Facebook use 
and frequency, political knowledge, and basic demographic 
information. Additionally, participants were asked about 
their awareness of political rumors and their feelings to-
ward the truthfulness of these rumors. Those who com-
pleted the questionnaire were offered the chance to win 1 
of 15, $20 Amazon gift cards in exchange for their partici-
pation. Gift card recipients were randomly selected from 
completed survey responses. 
The survey instrument measured both political 
knowledge and social media use. One section of the survey 
focused on respondents’ use of Facebook for general and 
political information. Participants also were asked about 
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their Facebook “friends” use of the social media site for po-
litical activity.  
 
Respondent Profile 
A total of 487 participants completed the survey. 
This represented a response rate of 19.5% in terms of the 
estimated number of original emails sent. However, this 
rate may be skewed as participants were encouraged to 
share the survey link within their social networks. Sixty 
percent of respondents were female, and 55.4% were cur-
rently in college. As for education, participants were asked 
to indicate the highest degree received, where 12.5% has a 
high school degree, 35.5% had completed some college, 
11.2% had an associate or trade degree, 20.6% had a 
bachelor’s degree and 20.1% had a graduate degree. The 
majority of the participants were White, non-Hispanic 
(83.5%), 3.1% were African-American, 1.5% were Hispanic, 
1.6% were Asian-American, 0.5% Pacific Islander, 3.4% 
Native American, and 5.5% indicated “other,” including 
mixed race or “multicultural.” Sixteen percent of partici-
pants were aged 18-20, 41.1% were ages 21-29, 12.8% were 
ages 30-39, 11.3% were ages 40-49, 11.8% were ages 50-59, 
and 7.1% were older than 60 years. (Political party affilia-
tion of participants is discussed in the results section.)  
 
Variable Definitions  
Several variables were used to understand social 
media usage and gullibility to online rumor. A brief discus-
sion of each variable follows. 
Facebook Addiction. In order to determine a poten-
tial correlation of Facebook usage to rumor gullibility, re-
searchers used Andreasson et al.’s (2012) scale to measure 
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the Facebook addiction level of survey respondents. The 
section required students to respond to directional state-
ments dealing with participants’ frequency of use and reli-
ance on Facebook, as well as provided space for open-
ended explanations and comments.  
Gullibility to Online Political Rumor. After answer-
ing the 18 Facebook addiction questions, respondents were 
asked to evaluate the truthfulness of 20 statements, which 
ranged in truthfulness from being completely true to com-
pletely false. All statements were adapted from rumors 
and true statements that circulated across social network-
ing sites during the 2012 presidential campaign. Selected 
rumors had been deemed true or false by the fact checking 
organization, PoltiFact✓.org. This online source uses a 
“Truth-O-Meter” to rate the accuracy of political state-
ments, including comments that are mostly true, half true 
and mostly false. Rumors selected for this study also var-
ied in their level of accuracy with some obviously rumor 
and others seemingly true. The included rumors were se-
lected to give equal rumor representation to both candi-
dates. First, respondents were asked about exposure to the 
20 online rumors, 10 for each presidential nominee. Re-
spondents were asked to evaluate the truthfulness of the 
20 statements on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging in truth-
fulness from being “Completely True” (5 points) to 
“Completely False” (1 point). The responses were then res-
cored to create a 5-point gullibility scale, where the more 
gullible the participant was to the rumor (i.e. the further a 
participant was away from the correct answer), the higher 
the score they received.  
Facebook Usage. In order to gauge the amount of 
time that participants were engaged with Facebook, the 
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Facebook Intensity Scale was used (Ellison et al., 2007). 
This scale, which has been found to interact with measur-
ing psychological well-being consists of eight questions 
that examine the number of friends a person has online, 
the amount of time on Facebook per day, and how people 
feel when they interact with Facebook.  
Political Engagement on Facebook.  The authors 
also examined how people used Facebook for political pur-
poses. Participants were asked how often they posted their 
political opinions, what types of post (for or against a can-
didate they liked and didn’t like), whether they com-
mented on political posts, and how many people they had 
unfriended because of political posts. 
Candidate Preferred. The authors divided this vari-
able into five categories: Romney, Obama, Other, None, 
and Undecided. 
Political Party Affiliation. This variable was com-
posed of five different groups: Democrat, Republican, Inde-
pendent, Other, and None.  
Political Ideology. Since many people do not 
strongly identify with any particular party, the authors 
examined participant’s political ideologies. This variable 
was measured via a 7-point Likert-type scale. The value of 
“1” matched “strongly liberal”; “2” equaled “moderately lib-
eral”; “3” was “slightly liberal”; “4” was “neutral”; “5” was 
“slightly conservative”; “6” matched “moderately conserva-
tive”; and “7” equaled “strongly conservative.” 
 
Results 
When asked about politics, 30.3% of respondents 
reported the 2012 election was their first. Roughly a third 
(33.9%) of participants categorized themselves as Democ-
 Page 251                    The Journal of Social Media in Society 5(1) 
rats, 43.6% considered themselves Republicans, 15.5% con-
sidered themselves Independent, 3.7% did not select a po-
litical category, and 3.3% selected “other.” In terms of ide-
ology, however, only 8.5% were very liberal, 20.9% were 
liberal, 32.2% of participants were moderate, 30.6% were 
conservative, and 7.9% were very conservative. When 
asked whom they were intending to vote for, the popula-
tion—much like the country itself—was equally divided. 
Although 13.7% of people were unsure about whom they 
were voting for, choosing not to vote, or for someone else, 
43.6% intended to vote for Romney, and 42.8% intended to 
vote for Obama. 
When asked about social media usage, 12.3% of 
participants reported having less that 50 friends, 8.5% had 
51-100 Facebook friends, 18.2% had 101-250 Facebook 
friends, 23.4% had 251-500 Facebook friends, 22.2% had 
501-1,000 friends, and 15.5% had more than 1,000 Face-
book friends. The majority of participants indicated that 
they spend less than 2 hours a day on Facebook—28.6% at 
<30 minutes, 26.5% at 31-60 minutes, and 21.5% at 1-2 
hours—13.0% spent 3-4 hours per day on Facebook, and 
10.4% indicated spending more than 5 hours per day on 
Facebook.  
When asked about political engagement on Face-
book, 48.4% of participants indicated they never posted 
their political opinions, 26.7% indicated they posted politi-
cal opinions less than once a week, 5.6% indicated they 
posted their political opinions once a week, 9.1% indicated 
they posted every couple of days, 4.8% indicated once a 
day and 5.4% indicated they posted multiple times per 
day. In terms of their reaction to political posts, 66.0% in-
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dicated they have never unfriended people because of a 
political post, 17.8% have unfriended 1-2 people, 7.7% 
have unfriended 3-4 people because of political posts, and 
8.5% have unfriended more than seven people because of a 
political post, thus answering RQ1. 
Additionally, when examining how Facebook addic-
tion level plays in political posting patterns, an independ-
ent sample t-test indicated no significant difference (t(444) 
= -.327, p > .241) in those with low (µ = 2.09, SD = 1.45) or 
high (µ = 2.14, SD  = 1.51) Facebook addiction on how of-
ten people posted their political opinions. Thus, the level of 
Facebook addiction does not affect how often people make 
political postings, answering RQ2. 
When examining how the level of gullibility to 
Table 1         
Age differences in Facebook Addiction and Gullibility 
to Rumor  
    Addiction   Gullibility   
    µ SD p   µ SD p   
        Age  
18-20 1.900 0.773 0.001  2.44 0.289 0.048  
21-29 1.850 0.768   2.47 0.307   
30-39 1.840 0.834   2.33 0.361   
40-49 1.590 0.612   2.41 0.612   
50-59 1.410 0.397   2.31 0.295   
  60+ 1.380 0.574     2.43 0.345     
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online political rumor plays into political posting patterns, 
an independent sample t-test indicated significant differ-
ences (t(381) = 2.047, p < .041) between those with high 
gullibility (µ = 2.25, SD = 1.53) and low gullibility (µ = 
1.95, SD  = 1.40). This indicated that those with high gulli-
bility to online political rumors posted opinions about poli-
tics more often than those with low gullibility. Thus, an-
swering RQ3.  
Next, the authors tested H1, which expected that 
as people age, they become less addicted to Facebook. Lev-
els of Facebook addiction were analyzed by running a one-
way ANOVA. Results (see Table 1) indicate significant dif-
ferences between groups (F(5, 347) = 4.632, p < .001).  
Those aged 18-20 had the highest level of addition (µ = 
1.90, SD = .773), followed by ages 21-29 (µ = 1.85, SD 
= .768), ages 30-39 (µ = 1.84, SD = .834), ages 40-49 (µ = 
1.59, SD = .612), ages 50-59 (µ = 1.41, SD = .397), and ages 
60 and older (µ = 1.38, SD = .574) with the lowest level of 
addiction. Specifically, Tukey’s HSD indicated those aged 
18-20 and 21-29 had a Facebook addiction level that was 
significantly greater than those ages 50-59 and 60 and 
older, thus supporting H1.  
Next, the authors tested H2, which expected as peo-
ple age, they become less gullible to online political rumor. 
Levels of gullibility were analyzed by running a one-way 
ANOVA. Results indicate significant differences between 
groups (F(5, 304) = 2.264, p < .048). Those aged 21-29 (µ = 
2.47, SD = .307) had the highest level of gullibility to 
online political rumor, followed by ages 18-20 (µ = 2.44, SD 
= .289), ages 40-49 (µ = 2.41, SD = .612), ages 30-39 (µ = 
2.33, SD = .361), ages 50-59 (µ = 2.31, SD = .295), and ages 
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60 and older (µ = 2.43, SD = .345). Younger age groups 
tended to have higher levels of gullibility, thus partially 
supporting H2. See Table 1 for a more detailed breakdown 
of ages and levels of gullibility to political rumor.   
The authors then tested H3 to determine if high 
social media consumption cultivated gullibility to online 
political rumor. Social media usage of participants was 
categorized into either a low and high category. From 
there, a t-test examining the effect that social media con-
sumption had on gullibility to online political rumor was 
run. Results indicated significant differences between 
groups (t(381) = -2.197, p < .029), where those with low 
social media usage (µ = 2.39, SD = .309) had a significantly 
lower level of gullibility to online rumor than those who 
had high social media usage (µ = 2.46, SD = .313). Thus, 
social media exposure is shown to be able to cultivate gul-
libility to online rumor—the more you see a rumor, the 
more you are likely to believe the rumor, and H3 is sup-
ported. 
Next, a simple linear regression was conducted to 
examine the relationship between the Facebook addiction 
scale and the gullibility to online political rumor, as pos-
ited in H4. Participants Facebook addiction level signifi-
cantly predicted the level of gullibility to online political 
rumor (F (1,351) = 20.801, p < .001), with an R2 = .056, 
where as Facebook addiction rises, so does gullibility to 
online political rumor (β = .104). Upon further analysis 
(when Facebook addiction was re-categorized into low and 
high), an independent sample t-test found significant dif-
ferences between the groups (t(351) = -3.834, p < .001), 
where those with low Facebook addiction (µ = 2.36, SD 
= .298) had a lower gullibility to online political rumor 
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than those with high Facebook addiction (µ = 2.49, SD 
= .312), supporting H4.  
Finally, RQ4 examined whether age played a role 
in the interaction of Facebook addiction and gullibility to 
online rumor. General Linear Modeling (GLM) indicated 
that although age played a factor in both Facebook addic-
tion and gullibility, when the two interacted, it did not (F 
(5, 285) = .900, p < .482), answering RQ4.  
 
Discussion 
By definition, social networks emerge when people 
carry on discussions and form personal relationships in 
cyberspace. Social networking sites encourage the forma-
tion of political opinions by allowing dissemination of po-
litical information with “followers” and “friends” (Shirky, 
2012). Indeed, with over a billion members, Facebook pro-
vides a fertile environment for political discussion. In this 
study, researchers found that high Facebook addiction cor-
relates with the gullibility of subjects to Internet rumors. 
When asked about political engagement on Face-
book, over half (51.6%) the participants indicated that they 
post political opinions online. Rates varied from less than 
one post per week (5.6%) to multiple posts per day (5.4%). 
Despite variation in posting frequencies, most participants 
indicated that they share their political views online with 
others in their social networks. Although there were no 
significant differences between Facebook addiction levels 
and posting patterns, researchers did find significant dif-
ferences between gullibility levels and posting patterns. 
Subjects with high levels of gullibility to political rumor 
were significantly more likely to post political opinion and 
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information. This supports Garrett’s (2011) findings that 
email rumors in the 2008 campaign functioned as a rein-
forcing spiral. The more political rumors an individual re-
ceived, the more rumors they believed; and the more ru-
mors they believed, the more rumors they shared. Thus, 
the posting and reposting of information by individuals 
most gullible to political rumor may help to spread the ru-
mors themselves. 
Although this study did not test the types of politi-
cal information shared by participants, previous research 
indicates that the most vocal political voices are often 
those who are the most politically active (Loader & 
Mercea, 2011). Thus, the process of sharing political infor-
mation with others online may promote political extrem-
ism and intensify political division (Garrett, 2011). Most of 
the participants in this study (66.0%) indicated that they 
have not “unfriended” someone because of political com-
ments. However, it is interesting to note that 34.0% of re-
spondents indicated “unfriending” one or more Facebook 
friends due to the content of their political posts. The act 
of “unfriending” those with opposing views may attribute 
to the tendency to expose oneself to only political informa-
tion that supports one’s beliefs. Thus, the individualistic 
nature of social networking sites is reinforced. Further-
more, some political discourse, especially if extreme, may 
risk turning voters off to the political process. 
Although voters don’t always trust social media 
sites, many indicate that they serve as an important 
source for political information. Moreover, previous re-
search indicates that young voters often turn to social me-
dia for political information more than any other group 
(Rainie & Smith, 2012; Zhang et al., 2009). Unfortunately, 
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online political information is not always accurate. In the 
current study, findings revealed that younger voters were 
significantly more addicted to Facebook. Additionally, 
younger voters also were significantly more gullible to po-
litical rumor. Since young voters often turn to social net-
works to serve as “conduits” of political information versus 
mere “consumers,” the researchers find these results par-
ticularly troubling. 
To determine if high social media consumption cul-
tivated gullibility to online political rumor, researchers 
categorized social media use into high or low usage levels. 
Results indicated those with low social media use had sig-
nificantly lower levels of gullibility and, conversely, those 
with high social media use had significantly higher levels 
of gullibility. This finding goes to back to the concept of 
cultivation in that, the more people see media online that 
is supporting their own ideology—regardless if it is true or 
not—the more their belief in their own ideology is sup-
ported, and the more they are likely to share that ideology 
or belief system with others. To further explore this rela-
tionship, researchers also compared the Facebook addic-
tion scale and gullibility to online political rumor. Find-
ings revealed that as Facebook addiction rises, so does gul-
libility. Thus, the concepts of cultivation are once again 
supported—the more time one spends with Facebook, the 
more likely he or she is to believe online political rumors.  
Findings may add to our understanding of the po-
tential for social media to impact political discourse. Ap-
plying cultivation theory, researchers found that high me-
dia use correlated with rumor gullibility. However, the 
study is limited, as it did not explicitly measure cultiva-
tion effects. Future research may want to explore cultiva-
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tion theory and its relationship to social media use. Addi-
tionally, it is possible that sensational political content 
may spread at a faster and greater rate. It is possible that 
some political rumors started before the general election 
period and/or persisted well beyond the election season. 
The reposting of political content may give the rumor lon-
gevity not measured by this study. Future research should 
investigate subjects’ likelihood to repost and share politi-
cal rumors. The study also was limited to the general elec-
tion. Future researchers should follow political rumor con-
tent over time. Furthermore, this study was limited to 
online communication; interpersonal relationships with off
-line family and friends likely impact political decision-
making. Off-line conversations may reinforce or dispute 
online political rumors. Additionally, this study did not 
address Facebook users’ ability to “hide” friends’ posts or 
the concept that some may avoid the site altogether during 
the peak of the election season. 
Despite limitations, the results of this study are of 
value. Although most voters do not share every political 
rumor they are exposed to on social media sites, they may 
share some political rumors. Without checking the accu-
racy of online political information, voters may share erro-
neous information. During political elections, the damage 
that erroneous information could cause once it goes viral 
could be significant. In fact, messages that political candi-
dates make could also be misconstrued and misinterpreted 
in the process. Just in the childhood game of “telephone” 
the message may be altered each time it is passed. Candi-
dates must be more aware of their messages and how they 
frame them, so that things are not taken out of context 
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and rumors spread. Moreover, individualistic political pre-
dispositions may be spread and political biases may be re-
inforced. As cultivation would suggest, heavy users are 
more likely see specific types of messages and reinforce 
them, especially if the messages are shared by people with 
the same ideology and networks. Individuals are often 
friends with like-minded people, and thus more likely to 
see messages that support their own belief system.  
Results suggest that heavy Facebook users are 
more likely to believe the political rumors that are posed 
online. If this is the case, they may also be more likely to 
believe the message their friends post because it is coming 
from a source that is trusted and like-minded. When mes-
sages are not congruent with their own belief system, us-
ers will likely unfriend, unfollow, or block messages that 
cultivate another ideology without checking to see if the 
messages, posts, and media are true or not. Thus, perhaps 
this explains why heavy users after more gullible to online 
rumor—they are seeing more messages from people they 
trust, and likely seeing a consistent ideology in them. Not 
only can high social media use influence the way voters 
attend to political content, but it also may influence how 
they share political information. Indeed, voters with high 
social media use may experience a skewed political reality. 
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